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INTRODUCTION 
Law professors in the 1950s and 1960s could easily teach torts using William 
Prosser’s “definitive” treatise, regularly reading the advance sheets, and give 
almost no thought to torts jurisprudence.1 During Prosser’s day, torts were a sleepy 
“backwater”2 where black letter law and practical principles dominated; it is not 
surprising that torts did not attract much attention from philosophers, sociologists, 
economists, or other theorists. In the 1920s and 1930s, judges began to adopt legal 
realism, deciding torts outside the doctrinal box by taking into account empirical 
evidence as well as nondeductive or nonanalogical policy arguments.3 As Benjamin 
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 * Thomas F. Lambert Jr. Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Intellectual 
Property Law Concentration, Suffolk University Law School; 2011 Chair of the Executive 
Committee of the American Association of Law Schools Section on Torts and Compensation 
Systems and organizer of the panel, “Twenty-First-Century Tort Theories: A New Audit.” 
Thanks to the research and editorial assistance of Alex Chiulli, Wystan Umland, and  Colin 
Barrett. I would also like to thank my fellow presenters and contributors to this symposium, 
Martha Chamallas, Christopher Robinette, Judge Guido Calabresi, Judge Richard Posner, 
John Goldberg, and Ben Zipursky. Finally, I would like to thank Tom Koenig, Chryss J. 
Knowles, Marshall S. Shapo, and Gabe Tenenbaum for their editorial suggestions for 
substantive changes as well as editorial assistance. 
 1. See Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2261 (1996) (book 
review). 
 2. Stephen D. Sugarman, The Transformation of Tort Reform, in ANDREW F. POPPER, 
MATERIALS ON TORT REFORM 40, 40 (2010). 
 3. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 546 (3d ed. 2005) 
(“The realists . . . doubted that judges could or should decide cases according to the dictates 
of legal logic. They had little or no tolerance of artifice, fictions, real and apparent 
irrationalities. Law was a working tool, an instrument of social policy; and it had to be seen 
in that light.”); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE (1995); see, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) 
(holding that Buick owed a duty of reasonable care to all foreseeable users irrespective of 
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Cardozo observed in his 1924 classic, The Growth of the Law, an “avalanche of 
decisions by tribunals great and small is producing a situation where citation of 
precedent is tending to count for less, and appeal to an informing principle is 
tending to count for more.”4  
Some forty-six years later, in a 1970 Stanford Law Review article, Marshall 
Shapo wrote about the role of torts in advancing policy goals and countering abuses 
of power.5 His sibylline prediction was that “[t]he Torts of the future will stress to 
an even greater degree, in Dean Green’s felicitous phrase, that tort law is very 
much public law.”6 Shapo’s legal realist approach called for public-policy-based 
torts that would check the private party much like constitutional law cases of that 
era checked abuses of government power.7  
Today, as John Witt observes, tort law attracts attention from the most talented 
legal academics and historians, and as a result has produced a “deluge of new 
work . . . wash[ing] against the formidable foundations of the field.”8 Civil recourse 
theory is an example of counter-hegemonic scholarship that challenges the 
dominant position of law and economics as well as other consequentialist 
approaches to tort law.9 Goldberg and Zipursky’s interpretation of tort law 
challenges the dominant assumptions of economists, legal realists, and socio-legal 
scholars who conceptualize torts as a way of shifting losses, deterring misconduct, 
and fulfilling other public purposes.10  
Each year the current chair of the Section on Torts and Compensation Systems 
has the privilege of proposing the topic for the section’s panel at the annual 
meetings. I organized an authors-meet-critics American Association of Law 
Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting panel highlighting the work of John Goldberg 
and Benjamin Zipursky because they have established a controversial but 
                                                                                                                 
any privity of contract); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1234 (1931) (presenting legal realism 
as a “movement in thought and work about law” within which certain points of departure are 
common); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 
(1931) (discussing approach of legal realists as requiring “faithful adherence to the 
actualities of the legal order as the basis of a science of law”). See generally WILLIAM 
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973) (describing the legal 
realism movement and the intellectual contributions of Karl Llewellyn to rules, skepticism, 
and other realist methods); Morton J. Horwitz, Mark Tushnet, Legal Historian, 90 GEO. L.J. 
131, 131 (2001) (describing Yale Law School as a center of legal realism in the 1920s and 
1930s). 
 4. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 5 (1924) (emphasis added). 
 5. Marshall S. Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas for the 70’s, 22 STAN. L. 
REV. 330, 333–35 (1970). 
 6. Id. at 334–35. 
 7. Id. at 335. 
 8. John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of 
Accidents, 1 J. TORT L., no. 1, 2007 at 1, 1. 
 9. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 514 (2003) 
(describing torts as a multi-paradigmatic field with five competing theories: compensation-
deterrence, enterprise liability, economic deterrence, social justice, and individual justice, of 
which there are three subtypes, libertarian theory, reciprocity theory and corrective justice). 
 10. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the 
Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1580 
(2006) (contending tort law is “about arming victims with a legal power to pursue those who 
have wronged them”). 
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substantial beachhead in American tort jurisprudence with their theory of civil 
recourse.11 This symposium issue of the Indiana Law Journal publishes the papers 
presented at the AALS’s Section on Torts and Compensation Systems January 5, 
2012 panel on “Twenty-First-Century Tort Theories.” The distinguished group of 
judges and professors on the AALS panel examined the implications of viewing 
civil recourse’s vision of tort law through the lenses of law and economics, critical 
feminism, and pluralism. 
What is civil recourse? Civil recourse theory, which drinks deeply from the well 
of political theory and moral philosophy, attempts to organize all twenty-first-
century tort law around the core concepts of private wrongs and accountability. 
Inspired by the bric-a-brac of Blackstone’s private wrongs,12 civil recourse’s focus 
is about one-on-one relationships between an injured plaintiff and her right of 
recourse against an individual defendant.13 John Goldberg describes the torts 
paradigm that he developed with Benjamin Zipursky as based upon the principle 
that tort victims have a right of action against their injurer by pursuing recourse 
through an avenue supplied by the state: 
By recognizing a legal right of action against a tortfeasor, our system 
respects the principle that the plaintiff is entitled to act against one who 
has legally wronged him or her. I call this the principle of civil 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243, 
243 (2011) (“In the past decade, civil recourse theory has emerged as an important new way 
of thinking about tort law as individual justice. Like corrective justice, civil recourse sees 
tort law as about deontological concepts such as right and wrong, in contrast to utilitarian 
accounts that focus on maximizing social welfare.”); see also Larry Reibstein, Rethinking 
Tort Law: Professor Benjamin Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory Moves to a Leading 
Position in American Tort Theory, FORDHAM LAW., Spring 2012, at 12, 15 (“Yale law 
professor Jules Coleman describes civil recourse theory as ‘the most important intervention 
in contemporary theory of tort law’ since corrective justice theory . . . .”). 
 12. John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in 
Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 10 (2004) [hereinafter Goldberg, Tort Law] (“To 
note but one such aspect, [the wrongs-based view’s] roots can be traced back to the likes of 
William Blackstone and Adam Smith. If modern Federalists are seeking a conception of tort 
law consonant with some of the basic tenets of classical liberalism, then a wrongs-based 
view is for them.” (footnote omitted)); see also Goldberg, supra note 9, at 516–19 
(explaining Blackstone’s impact on tort theory). 
 13. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American 
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) 
(“During the eighteenth century, a major ideological conflict between forward-looking 
Jeremy Bentham and backward-looking Blackstone foreshadowed the coming struggle 
between legal formalism and realism that took shape in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy maintained that the law must be refashioned to 
‘maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number.’ Bentham targeted Blackstone’s 
‘incrementalism, traditionalism and transcendentalism’ as a ‘barnacled, superstitious, 
reactionary [defense of the] status quo.’ Richard Posner’s The Problems of Jurisprudence 
supports the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham against Blackstone’s formulation. 
Judge Posner views Blackstone’s jurisprudence as hampering wealth maximization by 
imbuing the common law with a ‘transcendental aura’ that was ‘rooted in Saxon customary 
law.’ Under Blackstone’s formulation, judges did not create a legal regime that would best 
benefit society, but instead discovered divinely inspired ‘“oracles” of the law.’” (footnotes 
omitted)) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 12–13 (1990)). 
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recourse. The legal principle that the victim of a tort has a right of 
action against the tortfeasor is an instance of this more general idea.14 
In the past fifteen years, Goldberg and Zipursky have developed a unitary theory 
of tort law, joining its close relative, corrective justice,15 as the leading microlevel 
theories in today’s legal academy. Civil recourse theory has spread like a prairie 
fire, capturing the imagination of a new generation of torts scholars.16 The allure of 
this elegant theory is partially based upon its bilateral view of tort law and its 
emphasis on moral philosophy where an individual seeks recourse against an 
injurer. To civil recourse theorists, the law of torts is a predominately private-law 
subject, stripping down tort’s public-law functions of efficiency, loss allocation, 
deterrence, and social justice.17 Civil recourse theory is a rebuttal to courts that 
stretch tort principles on policy grounds or empirical evidence. 
The tort-theory war between the civil recourse paradigm and externalist 
perspectives is the basic theme of this symposium issue.18 By arguing that the only 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 
735 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
 15. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 
349, 352 (2002) (“For the defendant to be held liable, it is not enough that the defendant’s 
negligent act resulted in harm to the plaintiff. The harm has to be to an interest that has the 
status of a right, and the defendant’s action has to be wrongful with respect to that right.”). 
 16. Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 500 (2011) 
(discussing appeal of civil recourse theory to younger tort scholars). 
 17. Goldberg and Zipursky admire Blackstone and wish to return torts to private 
wrongs: 
When Sir William Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(1765-68) (“Commentaries”), his formulation of “private wrongs” was 
designed for a legal system that provided compensation largely for intentional 
torts. At that time, tort law was largely a legal institution to adjudicate conflict 
between neighbors and landowners, and to mediate relations between 
employers and employees. Volume Three of Blackstone’s Commentaries 
synthesized private wrongs before legal subjects were classified into “private 
and public spheres, and [the further division of private law] into the 
recognizable divisions of tort, contract, and property.” Volume Three of 
Commentaries is a snapshot of eighteenth century English tort law prior to the 
development of the fault-based negligence paradigm. Tort law of that period 
preserved the King’s peace and the domestic tranquility of the family and 
community by mediating conflict between neighbors over property and 
personal rights. 
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 10 (footnotes omitted) (quoting R. Blake Brown, Cecil 
A. Wright and the Foundations of Canadian Tort Law Scholarship, 64 SASK. L. REV. 169, 
174 (2001)). 
 18. In tort jurisprudence, the divide is between internalists who view torts as principally 
a private-law subject and externalists who emphasize tort’s public policies such as 
deterrence, efficiency, social justice, and other macrolevel policies. Corrective justice and 
civil recourse theory are the leading internalist perspectives, whereas law and economics is 
the leading externalist perspective. Cf. M. Neil Browne, Terri J. Keeley & Wesley J. Hiers, 
The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 49–50 
(1998) (“This social dimension is important in at least two senses. First, with respect to the 
differing externalist and internalist perspectives on science, we accept the superiority of the 
former: science, whether natural or social and including both its practioners [sic] and 
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legitimate role of tort law is to empower victims to rectify civil wrongs against 
them, civil recourse theory offers a new moral theory of tort law. This internalist 
perspective challenges other twenty-first-century theories that embrace an external 
or instrumental view of tort law. Civil recourse theory explicitly rejects the law and 
economics approaches of Judges Calabresi and Posner,19 who argue that a central 
role of the law of torts is either “to promote efficient resource allocation” or to 
constitute a compensation system.20 Goldberg and Zipursky argue that externalism, 
the dominant view in tort jurisprudence, is false, and they developed civil recourse 
theory as an internalist alternative. 
When I first suggested the idea of a symposium on civil recourse to Professors 
Goldberg and Zipursky, they questioned whether the AALS torts panel would 
overlap too much with the Florida State University (FSU) Symposium on Civil 
Recourse Theory.21 When I studied the scholarly record of the speakers at FSU’s 
Symposium, I immediately noticed that the invitees were all members of the same 
broad theoretical family.22 The speaker list was a Who’s Who of famous legal 
scholars who disproportionately shared Goldberg and Zipursky’s individualized 
perspective on tort law.23 The FSU Symposium speakers Jules Coleman, Arthur 
Ripstein, Ernest Weinrib, Stephen and Julian Darwall, Stephen Perry, all share 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s core assumption that torts are best viewed by focusing on 
the role of private rights of action. The FSU symposium participants debated the 
similarities and differences between corrective justice24 and civil recourse, which 
                                                                                                                 
theorists, does not operate in a vacuum with its own internal logic but rather comes under the 
influence of social forces. Second, not only is ‘the social’ an external influence on scientific 
inquiry, it is immanent in the process itself, by which we mean that scientists are not 
disinterested agents but rather are immersed in a web of relations that play an important role 
in determining the character of truths that emerge from their interactions.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 19. Judge Guido Calabresi is the 2011 Prosser Award recipient and Judge Richard 
Posner is the recipient for 2012. The Prosser Award “honors those who have made an 
outstanding contribution to the world of tort law scholarship.” Professor Jane Stapleton to 
Be Awarded William L. Prosser Award in Recognition of Her Scholarship on Torts and 
Products Liability, UTLAW, THE MAGAZINE OF THE UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/magazine/2012/10/29/professor-jane-stapleton-to-be-awarded-
william-l-prosser-award-in-recognition-of-her-scholarship-on-torts-and-product-liability/. 
Stephen Sugarman described Judges Calabresi and Posner as “the most important tort 
scholars of the last third of the 20th century” because of their scholarship “about the safety-
promoting potential of tort law, and economic models of tort law. Sugarman, supra note 2, at 
41. 
 20. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 1 (1987). 
 21. Symposium on Civil Recourse Theory, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/backissues/vol39/issue1.html. 
 22. See id. “Zipursky argues that civil recourse is better able to interpret the rights and 
wrongs structure of tort law than corrective justice, although he acknowledges there is much 
common ground between these theories.” Rustad, supra note 16, at 468–69. 
 23. The FSU Symposium speakers, Jules Coleman, Arthur Ripstein, Ernie Weinrib, 
Stephen and Julian Darwall, and Stephen Perry, are all inclined to approach tort law from a 
microperspective. See, e.g., Stephen Darwall & Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse as Mutual 
Accountability, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17 (2011); John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 43 (2011); Scott Hershovitz, Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse 
Theorists, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (2011). 
 24. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Tort Liability and the Limits of Corrective Justice, 
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constituted a discussion within the internal perspective.25 The FSU speakers agree 
fundamentally that microlevel individualized justice, rather than law and 
economics, best describes tort law.26  
The goal of this symposium issue was to gather distinguished macrolevel 
theorists to evaluate the claims of civil recourse from external perspectives in an 
authors-meet-critics format. This AALS torts panel subjects the claims of civil 
recourse theory to hard-hitting critiques from the externalist perspectives of 
sociology, law and economics, critical theory, and pluralism. In his AALS panel 
presentation, John Goldberg makes the intrepid claim that civil recourse theory 
“does a better job than some other theories of making sense of tort law that we 
have.”27 His audacious theory criticizes the bread-and-butter deterrence theorists, 
the California Supreme Court, and the reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
for their policy-directed instrumental approaches to duty in the negligence 
equation.28 In his Unloved article, John Goldberg writes that courts and tort 
scholars need to refocus their lenses on individual cases: 
I am suggesting that we must recapture the idea that tort cases are 
concerned with the focused task of identifying and remedying instances 
in which an actor has wronged another, as opposed to providing 
localized compensation or insurance schemes, regulating antisocial 
conduct for the good of society, or the like.29 
By taking shots at all of these influential tort theories, Goldberg and Zipursky 
have placed themselves in a position similar to Butch Cassidy and the Sundance 
Kid, who never met a bank that they did not like to rob. In the famous 1969 movie, 
                                                                                                                 
in IN HARM’S WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOEL FEINBERG 139 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen 
Buchanan eds., 1994); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and 
Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV. 143 (1990). 
 25. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) on the distinction between 
external and internal perspectives on a legal system. See Jane Stapleton, Evaluating 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1556 (2006). 
 26. Just by way of example, University of Toronto Law Professor Arthur Ripstein 
contends that civil recourse cannot be separated from corrective justice theory:  
Goldberg and Zipursky seek to separate civil recourse from corrective justice 
by showing that tort law, at least as it is found in the United States of America, 
does not work in the ways in which corrective justice theory says that it must. 
The strategy of separation, in turn, rests on a separation between wrongs and 
remedies, a separation between ideas of risk and ideas of ordinariness, a 
separation between abstract characterizations of rights and contingent social 
norms, and, finally, a separation between a wrong done against the plaintiff and 
her power to exact a remedy. I shall argue that none of these separations can be 
made. 
Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 163, 164 (2011). 
 27. John C.P. Goldberg, Address at the Association of American Law Schools Annual 
Meeting, Twenty-First Century Tort Theories: A New Audit of Civil Recourse Theory (Jan. 5, 
2012) [hereinafter Goldberg Podcast], available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
tortsprof/2012/07/podcast-of-2012-aals-panel-on-civil-recourse-theory.html. 
 28. Id. 
 29. John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1501, 1519 (2002).  
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Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, a relentless posse pursues Butch and 
Sundance after they robbed the Union Pacific railroad.30 The outlaws used every 
technique to evade the posse, but the law officers just kept coming because the 
railroad had assembled a uniquely skilled group of law enforcement officers to 
track down the notorious outlaws.31 The tort-theory posse in this symposium issue 
consists of a carefully selected group of merciless hunters—Richard Posner and 
Guido Calabresi, two prominent federal judges, join with Martha Chamallas, a 
proponent of critical legal theory, and Chris Robinette, a pluralist theorist—who 
defend instrumentalism’s place in tort law. 
In their respective contributions to this symposium, federal appeals court judges 
Calabresi and Posner do not find civil recourse particularly illuminating or helpful 
in describing the complexity of real life torts. Chamallas contends that civil 
recourse theory’s gallery of private wrongs is decidedly male in ethos, leaving out 
unrecognized wrongs suffered by women, minorities, and outsiders. Robinette 
argues that civil recourse theory’s account is incomplete as it fails to account for 
routinized litigation, such as automobile accident law, that accounts for so much of 
torts legal landscape. 
After reviewing the symposium contributions of Calabresi, Posner, Chamallas, 
and Robinette, one might half expect John to turn to Ben and ask in the famous 
words of Butch Cassidy, “Who are those guys?” Alternatively, Ben might ask John, 
the Sundance Kid of tort theory, “How many are following us?” Goldberg would 
reply, “All of ’em.” To which Ben responds: “All of ’em? What’s the matter with 
those guys?”32 Some might see this symposium issue as a concerted effort to drive 
civil recourse theory off the cliff by the relentless pursuit of consequentialist-and 
instrumentally-inspired tort theorists. Nevertheless, the purpose of an external 
critique is to raise questions that any tort theory claiming to be unitary must 
confront such as: Where do private wrongs come from? How do torts evolve or 
devolve as society and technology change? Why do torts highlight some private 
wrongs but not others? How do class, race, gender, and power differentials 
determine what is and what is not included in this gallery of wrongs? If civil 
recourse theory explains all of tort law, what accounts for the crazy quilt of a fifty-
one-jurisdiction tort law, tort reforms, social insurance, and economic analysis? 
What is the role of the judiciary in recognizing new torts, eliminating old 
immunities, or supplanting contributory negligence with comparative negligence?33 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID (Twentieth Century Fox, Newman-
Foreman Company & Campanile Productions 1969). 
 31. See id. 
 32. I adapt this from the final scene when a relentless posse in Bolivia is pursuing Butch 
and the Sundance Kid. Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (1969)—Memorable Quotes, 
IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0064115/quotes. 
 33. The issue of whether courts or the legislature should make tort law or reform it is an 
old question. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Thrust of Tort Law Part II: Judicial Law Making, 
64 W. VA. L. REV. 115, 125 (1962) (“[T]he surest means of rendering law unstable and 
unjust is the adherence to precedents which have died on the vine and it is as much the 
function of courts to remove them from the law as it is to make new precedents.”); Robert E. 
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1962) (calling for a 
creative role of the judiciary in reforming tort law); Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts 
and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1963) (arguing that 
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Must judges adopt a Rip van Winkle philosophy of judicial stagnation or may 
they creatively eliminate archaic immunities and harsh doctrines in response to 
social and technological changes?34 Is the final goal of tort law civil recourse or 
economic efficiency, reducing the sum of accident costs, social justice, efficiency, 
deterrence, or a multiplicity of conflicting factors? How well does tort law give 
recourse to women, minorities, workers, or other groups without powerful lobbies? 
The contributors to this symposium issue pose all of these questions and more. 
Civil recourse theory must tackle the reality that “the common law is always in the 
process of becoming. It will be motionless only when it ceases to exist.”35 
Even Goldberg and Zipursky’s critics acknowledge that civil recourse theory 
has elevated tort scholarship, but each external theorist writing in this symposium 
asks probing questions that demand answers. The articles from the AALS panel 
subject civil recourse to searing criticism, recalling the definition of a critic as a 
person who finds a great deal of bad in the best of things. Subjecting civil recourse 
theory to an external critique will spur the development of more refined twenty-
first-century tort theories. 
I. A SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF ONE-DIMENSIONAL TORT LAW 
A. Civil Recourse Theory: A Critical Introduction 
Before introducing the founding fathers of civil recourse, the critics, and the 
symposium articles, I will exercise the prerogative of the organizer to sketch out 
my own brief critique of civil recourse theory.36 No single twenty-first-century tort 
theory has a lock on all solutions, and, fortunately, we have other perspectives that 
capture tort law’s multiplicity of functions. The civil recourse theorists argue 
forcefully that torts is a law of private wrongs; a way of “providing victims with an 
avenue of civil recourse against those who have wrongfully injured them.”37 
Goldberg and Zipursky base tort liability only “on the commission of a wrong—a 
failure to act in accordance with a relational norm of right conduct—that in turn 
generates in a victim of the wrong a power to respond to the wrongdoer.”38 
B. Shrinking Tort’s Public Purposes 
While Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge that torts have a public dimension in 
setting standards of conduct and in judicial decision making based on public policy 
concerns, civil recourse theory minimizes the public functions of tort law.39 In their 
                                                                                                                 
courts should reform torts in the face of legislative indifference). 
 34. I draw this question from Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Editorial, Reflections of an 
Optimist, 21 NAACA L.J. 25, 27 (1958) (describing the “Rip van Winkle philosophy of 
judicial stagnation”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See also Rustad, supra note 16. 
 37. John C.P. Goldberg, Lecture, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1221, 1252 (2008). 
 38. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1150 (2007). 
 39. John Goldberg contends that tort law should not be an instrumentality for solving 
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book, they argue that it is misleading to even speak of the functions of tort law: 
“Tort is not a system for deterring antisocial conduct, or a system for providing 
funds to needy injury victims, or a system for achieving civil peace.”40 Civil 
recourse theory views torts primarily as a private-law subject, which provides 
victims of a wrong with “an avenue of recourse.”41 The civil recourse theory of tort 
law, according to its founding fathers, 
aims to make sense of the concepts and categories that lawyers, judges, 
and legislators deploy when dealing with the legal dimensions of 
certain kinds of interpersonal interactions. Broadly speaking, our 
inquiry has proceeded on the assumption that these concepts and 
categories hang together as a reasonably coherent set (although we 
would be willing to reject this assumption, should it become 
untenable).42 
Civil recourse would be greatly enriched if Goldberg and Zipursky would 
engage in sociological research by climbing down from the parapet of their ivory 
tower and begin investigating how courts, regulatory agencies, and alternative 
compensation plans address real world problems such as how the latent injury 
problem should be resolved in complex environmental and mass products liability 
actions. To date, civil recourse theory conceives of torts in a rarefied box that does 
not permit empirical studies of the law in action, but focuses largely on chestnuts or 
classic appellate cases. Their analysis is conceptually elegant but lacks the “smell 
of the streets.”43 Goldberg and Zipursky seem to prefer the world of abstract rights 
and wrongs to the dust-bowl empiricism necessary to demystify the modern tort 
law in action.44 
                                                                                                                 
the large-scale social and political problems it is being asked to solve (if only 
by default). The tort system, for example, is not a social insurance scheme, and 
if it is the case that a wealthy society ought to have such a scheme as a matter 
of justice, then we should adopt that scheme independently of the tort system. 
Goldberg, supra note 29, at 1518 (footnotes omitted). He also thinks that too many courts 
deny liability as a matter of law in the name of “public policy.” Id. at 1518–19; see also 
Goldberg, Tort Law, supra note 12, at 10 (emphasizing torts’ private as opposed to public 
law purposes). 
 40. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO 
U.S. LAW: TORTS 65 (2010). 
 41. Id. 
 42. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Revisited, 39 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 341, 342 (2011). 
 43. I am grateful to Marshall Shapo for telling the story of how American reporters in 
Europe in the late thirties tried to capture the “smell of the streets.” 
 44.  
Roscoe Pound’s 1910 essay, Law in Books and Law in Action, described how 
judicial law making in his day ‘expected to force the case into the four corners 
of the pigeon-hole the books have provided.’ The legal formalists of Pound’s 
day did not appreciate that law is situated within social bonds. What’s missing 
in civil recourse theory is an account of the complex social web shaping tort 
rights and remedies. Civil recourse theory has no explanation of who makes 
torts claims and the role of the contingency fee system in making civil recourse 
possible for most consumers. 
Rustad, supra note 16, at 480 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and 
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Justice Benjamin Cardozo denounced such formalistic scholarship as “artificial, 
smelling a little of the [scholar’s] lamp.”45 Civil recourse theory steadfastly avoids 
the empirical investigation championed by legal realism, preferring the ethereal 
world of the legal heavens to the disordered world of torts on the ground.46 These 
theorists seem to prefer to retell long-standing tort stories about eighteenth-century 
concepts such as alienation of affection rather than addressing modern problems 
such as the gusher in the Gulf of Mexico or the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund. Proponents of this model rarely address state-of-the-art tort 
problems such as multiple causation, lost chance, climate change, cybercrime 
enablement, or emergent social problems created by modern technology. 
The famous mathematician’s toast, “Here’s to pure mathematics—may it never 
be of any use to anybody,”47 expresses civil recourse theorists’ zest for formalistic 
models. Nevertheless, civil recourse will be ultimately judged on whether it is 
useful to tort teachers, judges, and policy makers and less on its internal coherence. 
Civil recourse theory’s distinctive vocabulary is not yet widely employed by 
practitioners, tort participants, or jurists because it owes more to Sir William 
Blackstone than to legal realism.48 Judge Posner, who prefers Bentham’s 
utilitarianism to Blackstone’s barnacle-ridden, private-wrongs theory, does not 
believe that civil recourse theory has the theoretical power to displace law and 
economics.49 In Judge Posner’s article for this symposium issue, he provides 
                                                                                                                 
Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 20 (1910)).  
 45. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN 
NATHAN CARDOZO: THE CHOICE OF TYCHO BRAHE 339, 348 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947). 
 46. Rustad, supra note 16, at 494–95 (2011) (“The civil recourse theories propose a tort 
law for the legal heavens rather than this world. They stand at legal heaven’s gate with their 
abstract and obscure conceptualism, fact-free and devoid of social context. The problem with 
their approach is that tort law is not normative like ethics; rather, tort law is more akin to a 
sociological reality. . . . Civil recourse, too, is separated from social context because their 
abstracted approach to tort law is separated from social context and the politics of the tort 
wars. . . . Tort law does not descend disembodied from the thin, rarefied air of the legal 
heavens. Roscoe Pound castigated the law professors of his time for acting like ‘legal monks 
who pass their lives in an atmosphere of pure law, from which every worldly and human 
element is excluded.’” (footnotes omitted)) (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Need of a 
Sociological Jurisprudence, 31 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 911, 919 (1907)); see also Felix S. Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809 (1935) 
(comparing legal formalism to a “heaven of legal concepts” where concepts descend from 
heavens rather than from society). 
 47. ARTHUR C. CLARKE, The Pacifist, in TALES FROM THE WHITE HART 64, 74 (1970). 
 48. See Goldberg, Tort Law, supra note 12, at 10 (“The wrongs-based view of tort law 
that I have sketched and invoked as a basis for bolstering the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
to intervene in Campbell contains various aspects that should appeal to members of the 
Federalist Society even apart from this view’s ability to explain why certain perceived 
excesses in the tort system ought to be reined in. To note but one such aspect, its roots can be 
traced back to the likes of William Blackstone and Adam Smith. If modern Federalists are 
seeking a conception of tort law consonant with some of the basic tenets of classical 
liberalism, then a wrongs-based view is for them.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 49. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 12 (“Richard Posner’s The Problems of 
Jurisprudence supports the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham against Blackstone’s 
formulation. Judge Posner views Blackstone’s jurisprudence as hampering wealth 
maximization by imbuing the common law with a ‘transcendental aura’ that was ‘rooted in 
Saxon customary law.’” (citations omitted)). 
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empirical evidence that civil recourse theory has had no significant impact on 
judicial decision making, at least for its first fourteen years.50 
Civil recourse theory’s influence in the torts academy is far greater than in judicial 
decision making and practice. The complexity of injury in the information-based 
economy has created new dilemmas that require a stretching of tort law principles. 
Tort theories must incorporate a theory of social change recognizing that the 
common law is not a stagnant pond, but a moving stream.51 Civil recourse theory is 
missing a dynamic account of where the doctrine came from and where it is likely to 
go in responding to emergent social problems. There is no account of how torts 
evolved from a writs-based private law system with actions for conspiracy, trespass 
on the case, and ancient familial torts—such as alienation of affection, criminal 
conversation, or seduction—to today’s complex tort law, where systems of 
compensation are often a cultural mirror, reflecting societal conflict rather than 
consensus. Unitary tort theories must explain how tort law changes and what role 
judges versus the legislature should play in tort lawmaking. New torts have birthdays, 
and the bell tolls for old torts that are now consigned to the ashbin of legal history. 
After the Second World War, U.S. courts eliminated immunities that were 
roadblocks to civil recourse to accommodate and reflect social changes.52 Goldberg 
and Zipursky have no explanation of why civil recourse expands through 
extensions of the law of negligence or contracts because of judicial or legislative 
tort reforms. The progression of injury law over the past “two and one half 
millennia . . . has generated a broad and ever-developing framework of injury 
law,”53 and the latest iteration is civil wrongs on the Internet. 
Carl Sagan famously said, “[W]e live in a society exquisitely dependent on 
science and technology, in which hardly anyone knows anything about science and 
technology.”54 Virtual torts—such as the invasion of privacy, defamation, Internet 
security, the conversion of domain names, or spam cybertrespass—have no room in 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s gallery of wrongs.55 Yet virtual injuries are gifts that keep 
on giving, impossible to entirely expunge once they go viral.56 The test of civil 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Table 1 in Judge Posner’s article reveals only nineteen opinions where Goldberg and 
Zipursky’s work on civil recourse is cited. Many of these judicial opinions cite their work on 
determining duty under civil recourse theory. 
 51. Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge that “tort law has by no means been standing 
still over the centuries.” GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 40, at 25. Furthermore, they 
write that tort law has been shaped by “[t]echnological, economic and sociological changes.” 
Id. at 373. They do not say what they mean by these variables and how they account for 
emergence of new wrongs or withering away of old ones. 
 52. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (stripping 
the municipality of governmental immunity for neglect of prisoner who suffocated when his 
cell filled with smoke); Brown v. City of Omaha, 160 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1968) (holding 
governmental entities liable for negligence in case involving publicly owned vehicle). See 
generally Fleming James, Jr., Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226 (1954). 
 53. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 22 (2012). 
 54. Thomas Goetz, Life Hacker, WIRED, June 2012, at 108, 112. 
 55. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 40, at 372–74 (explaining how the 
Communications Decency Act blocks new forms of tort liability in cyberspace). 
 56. Professor Anita Bernstein has noted that torts on social network sites are particularly 
insidious because they “leverage trust and vouching,” lending credibility to anything posted 
in cyberspace. Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457, 
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recourse’s power is whether this theory can account for tort’s complexity, not just 
intentional torts or trespass-based causes of action. In December 2012, an estimated 
633 million websites were active in cyberspace.57 More than two billion computers 
are connected to the Internet,58 but the actual number is unknown and unknowable. 
In the mid-twentieth century, courts forged new causes of action such as products 
liability, informed consent, the invasion of privacy, and premises liability.59 In the 
new millennium, innovative cybertort rights and remedies are just beginning to 
evolve to address new forms of virtual injury.60 The potential for Internet-related 
lawsuits in the blogosphere is staggering. Virtual torts—such as the invasion of 
privacy or defamation—are frequently difficult to expunge once they go viral.61 
Social networks “leverage trust and vouching, [lending] credibility [to] hurtful 
materials posted.”62 
Plaintiffs in virtual injury cases will find that an injurious comment is difficult to 
expunge from the Internet, unlike a newspaper where a retraction and the passage of a 
few days may reduce the radius of the injury significantly. Even with the help of 
companies such as Reputation Defender that will attempt to expunge tortious 
postings, you cannot really “unring the bell” once information is posted, copied, and 
forwarded around the globe. Libelous content may be mirrored on other sites and 
preserved by the Wayback Machine that enables users to “[b]rowse through over 150 
billion web pages archived from 1996 to a few months ago.”63 To access past 
postings, the user of the “Wayback . . . type[s] in the web address of a site or page 
where [they] would like to start, and press[es] enter.”64 Goldberg and Zipursky 
have created another type of “Wayback Machine,” taking tort law back to its 
eighteenth century roots as described in Blackstone’s Commentaries (1765–68). 
Nevertheless, a modern tort theory must also account for evolving cybertorts65 in 
an increasingly cross-border legal environment, where tortfeasors can defame, 
invade privacy, and misappropriate trade secrets at the click of a mouse in hundreds 
of jurisdictions simultaneously.66 Nevertheless, Internet-related torts also arise on 
                                                                                                                 
1460 (2012). 
 57. December 2012 Web Server Survey, NETCRAFT (Dec. 4, 2012), http://news.
netcraft.com/archives/2012/12/04/december-2012-web-server-survey.html. 
 58. World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS (July 29, 
2012), http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 
 59. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1539, 1541 (1997) (explaining how new causes of action evolved).  
 60. See generally Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: 
An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77 (2003). 
 61. What Cardozo wrote about defamation is especially true about the Internet: 
“Reputation . . . is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.” 
People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 492 (1928) (Cardozo, J.). 
 62. Bernstein, supra note 56, at 1460. 
 63. Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://archive.org/web/web.php. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Virtual torts or cybertorts are civil actions to recover chiefly economic, reputational, or 
privacy-based damages arising from Internet communications such as email, blogs, or website 
postings. 
 66.  
The history of tort law is a story of the common law evolving, as it is “not a 
closed system of static rules, immutable unless changed by legislation.” The 
earliest American exemplary damages punished conduct that violated local 
2013] TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY TORT THEORIES 431 
 
Twitter, blogs, social media sites, e-mail transmissions, website postings, or software 
distribution, in contrast to traditional categories of injury such as automobile 
accidents, slip-and-fall mishaps, medical malpractice, or injuries due to dangerously 
defective products. The largest numbers of Internet tort cases have been publication 
torts filed by companies.67 Internet tort cases have given rise to new questions of 
liability not addressed by civil recourse theory. For example, if an intruder or virus 
exploits a website, destroying or altering data belonging to third parties, does the 
company's failure to have a contingency plan make it liable? Civil recourse theorists 
do not explain why so few consumers seeking recovery for virtual injuries have been 
able to hold defendants accountable. 
In 1995, Senator J. James Exon of Nebraska introduced the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA).68 Under the CDA, Congress immunized the providers of 
interactive computer services for third-party content posted on their services to 
preserve the “vibrant and competitive free market” of ideas on the Internet.69 The 
plain language of the CDA shields websites from information-based torts in the 
United States. Section 230 of the CDA precludes plaintiffs from making interactive 
computer service providers liable for the publication of information created by third 
parties.70 Section 230 of the CDA provides, “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider” and “[n]o cause of action may 
be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.”71  
                                                                                                                 
norms, such as the debauchery of the plaintiff's daughter, destroying her 
“parental prospects.” During the pre-Civil War period, the tort remedy of 
punitive damages gave slave owners a remedy for tortuously harboring fleeing 
slaves. “By the end of the nineteenth century, . . . [tort remedies were] a means 
of social control against the reckless endangerment of the public by the 
proprietors of railroads, streetcars, coal mines, and other industrial enterprises.” 
Tort law functions are continually evolving to address new social problems. 
Tort law’s signature has been its ability to evolve and recognize new causes of 
action or simply to adapt old causes of action to new social problems. 
Specifically, tort law has for centuries evolved to solve public health hazards in 
each historic epoch. The period from the end of the Second World War until the 
early 1980s was the epoch of the consumer in American tort law. Lawrence 
Friedman describes how the old tort law served as “a law of limitation,” 
whereas twentieth-century courts and legislatures “limited or removed the 
obstacles that stood in the way of plaintiffs.” The real “tort reforms,” beginning 
in the middle of the twentieth century, remade tort law to be “more responsive 
to the claims of injured people.” 
Rustad, supra note 16, at 478–79 (footnotes omitted). 
 67. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. 
L. REV. 335, 351 (2005) (“Repeat players such as ISPs have no qualms about protecting their 
rights through Internet lawsuits over intellectual property, tort, and contract rights, all of 
which are primarily resolved in federal courts.”). 
 68. For a legislative history of the CDA, see generally Robert Cannon, The Legislative 
History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the 
Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996). 
 69. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2), (c)(1) (2006). 
 70. Id. § 230. 
 71. Id. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3). 
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To fall within the protection of section 230 of the CDA, a website must show: 
“(1) [it is] a provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the cause of 
action treat[s] the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the 
information at issue [is] provided by another information content provider.”72 Since 
Congress enacted the CDA in 1996, federal courts have stretched section 230’s 
immunity for publisher liability to cover almost every conceivable tort.73 Civil 
recourse theorists have nothing to say about cybertorts or section 230 of the CDA. 
Civil recourse does not explain why Internet service providers have what is, in 
effect, a complete immunity from liability for all conceivable torts or take a 
position as to whether Congress should revoke this broad immunity.74 Civil 
recourse theory brings to mind the late Larry Ribstein’s description of the 
Langdellian case method, “Protected from the harsh winds of the markets, legal 
educators were free to develop a hothouse plant that bore little resemblance to 
anything that grew in the natural soil of law practice.”75 
Civil recourse theory is predicated upon a closed system of common-law 
precedent. In the social sciences, closed systems are the province of scientists who 
isolate a particular structure and its effects in order to perform experiments.76 Open 
systems, in contrast are “systems of the real world where many structures operate 
and may cancel the effects of other structures.”77 “Realists [have therefore] 
argue[d] that the social sciences [must] deal with similarly complex open systems 
and, therefore, prediction is an inappropriate and misleading objective.”78 In 
comparison, legal academics trained in the social sciences are careful not to isolate 
their objects of study from their social context, arguing that vital insights about 
latent functions are lost when the phenomena are not viewed holistically. Civil 
recourse needs to deal with the ways that tort law changes to meet new challenges 
presented by social changes such as the rapid growth of globalization.79  
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 73. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 67, at 362. 
 74. Goldberg and Zipursky mention Internet torts briefly in their Introduction to U.S. 
Law: Torts, but they do not explain or even take a position on why plaintiffs injured by 
publication torts have no recourse due to section 230 of the CDA. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, 
supra note 40, at 372–74. The question unanswered is why there is a civil–recourse-free 
zone for Internet-related torts. Goldberg and Zipursky do not say whether it is a good thing 
for Internet service providers to owe no duties for third party torts in cyberspace. 
 75. Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 1649, 1655 (2011). 
 76. THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 499 (Bryan S. Turner ed., 2006). 
 77. Id. (“Realism became influential in the social sciences following Thomas Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn challenged the view that science proceeded 
in a linear and accumulative manner, arguing that there are fundamental changes in 
world-views and that different scientific paradigms are incommensurable.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 78. Id. 
 79. It is not enough to say that tort law’s gallery is inherited or that it is historically 
contingent or a product of history, sociology, and technology. What’s missing from civil 
recourse theory is a theory of how torts change and how tort law’s gallery is a product of 
conflict, rather than this approach’s engineered and artificial consensus. 
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II. IN DEFENSE OF CIVIL RECOURSE: GOLDBERG AND ZIPURSKY 
Like Martin Luther who nailed ninety-five theses to the church door in 1517 in 
the Castle Church of Wittenberg, Germany, Goldberg and Zipursky are challenging 
the core orthodoxies that have dominated torts scholarship for the past half 
century.80 Together they “have offered the idea of civil recourse and the ideas of 
relational, legal, injury-inclusive wrongs as unifying features of tort law and tort 
theory.”81 Their tort law is, at its core, a microlevel “law of wrongs and recourse.”82 
Like the religious sectarians, Goldberg and Zipursky seek to restore the original, 
unpolluted doctrine, observing that Torts is the only first-year law school subject 
that does not address a basic legal category.83 No other first-year subject has to 
agonize over its fundamental nature. The law of contracts, for example, clearly 
addresses the category of “consensually defined duties.”84 
This symposium issue explores the long-term implications of reducing tort law’s 
multiplicity to the bilateral relations between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s civil recourse theory will be critically assessed from the 
externalist perspectives of law and economics, critical feminism, and pluralism. 
Through challenging authors-meet-critics symposia such as this, models are further 
refined and elaborated. Their joint presentation at the AALS panel explained civil 
recourse theory’s core claims and applied their theory to three contemporary cases 
to illustrate its robustness in interpreting contemporary tort law. Goldberg describes 
duty-imposing rules as key to civil recourse because they grant individuals and 
entities the alarmingly simple right to an avenue of recourse for a wrong. Here, he 
acknowledges an intellectual debt to H.L.A. Hart in conceptualizing tort law as a 
power-conferring branch of the common law.85 He notes that civil recourse theory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. Blackstone’s private wrongs theory was the orthodoxy in eighteenth-century English 
law. 
Under Blackstone’s formulation, judges did not create a legal regime that 
would best benefit society, but instead discovered divinely inspired “‘oracles’ 
of the law.” The role of the lawyer was to “translate the oracular discourse for 
the laity.” 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. attacked Blackstone’s notion of legal doctrine as 
divinely inspired, arguing that law was “the creation of distinctly earthbound 
political authorities—legislators and, at the time, especially judges.” Holmes 
castigated Blackstone’s formalistic model of the English common law for its 
lack of coherence and inability to evolve to meet new social challenges . . . . 
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 13, at 12 (footnotes omitted) (with Holmes describing 
Blackstone’s private wrongs as a “ragbag of details”). 
 81. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
917, 978 (2010). 
 82. Id. at 981. 
 83. Id. at 917–18. 
 84. Id. at 918–19. 
 85. H.L.A. Hart (1907–92) was a theorist in the formalistic jurisprudential tradition. 
H.L.A. Hart’s theory was that law  
is not only composed of rules that impose duties as well as confer powers . . . . 
Hart claims that at the foundation of every legal system lies a social rule that 
sets out the criteria of legal validity. This master rule, which Hart calls ‘the rule 
of recognition,’ determines which power-conferring and duty-imposing rules 
are valid in the system. 
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must explain why certain persons and entities are immune from the power to seek 
recourse, even though they have done an injury that would otherwise be a tort.  
A. Goldberg’s Core Concepts of Civil Recourse Theory 
In his part of the AALS panel presentation, John Goldberg outlined the concepts 
and methods of civil recourse and its main claims. In Goldberg’s view, tort law is 
not a system of compensation but fundamentally about victim empowerment. This 
fundamental principle of having an avenue of recourse to redress private wrongs is 
as American as apple pie and the Fourth of July. Civil recourse theory is a 
distinctively American theory with its evocative principle of the empowerment of 
ordinary citizens to redress wrongs. Goldberg and Zipursky argue in their 
contributions to this symposium that torts are good for empowering victims to seek 
civil recourse for recognized civil wrongs through a venue supplied by the State. 
They also argue that tort law is not suitable for achieving public-law functions such 
as deterrence, efficiency, or loss allocation. 
In their privatized vision of tort law, the State’s role is confined to providing an 
avenue of recourse for the empowered plaintiff to obtain recourse if their claim fits 
within established categories. Fifty years ago, before the rise of law and economics 
and corrective justice, Tort teachers would not be asking the question: What is tort 
law? Office lawyers and judges might have denounced this topic as elevating the 
obvious to the esoteric. John Goldberg, in his AALS presentation, argued that civil 
recourse theory is composed of three levels: (1) rights of action, (2) wrongs, and (3) 
remedies. The first level of his civil recourse law is about arming people with a 
legal power to seek and obtain recourse. In the second level, Goldberg explains that 
this level has intuitive appeal because the word tort is synonymous with wrongs.86 
In Goldberg’s view, tort law in the basic Hohfeldian sense is a power-conferring or 
victim-empowering branch of private law.87 
Goldberg argues that a tort must not only be a wrong, but a wrong defined by 
the law.88 Civil recourse assumes that being a moral wrong is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for a tort; torts are not merely legal wrongs, but relational 
wrongs.89 Goldberg makes the bold claim that civil recourse theory is better suited 
                                                                                                                 
SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 80 (2011). 
 86. The earliest torts treatises described torts as private wrongs as well. E.g., C.G. 
ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES (William E. 
Gordon & Walter Hussey Griffith eds., 8th ed. 1906); FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF 
REMEDIES FOR TORTS, OR PRIVATE WRONGS (1867). 
 87. Wesley Hohfeld, like civil recourse theory, focuses on two-person rights and duties. 
See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
 88. Here, civil recourse theory owes a deep intellectual debt to corrective justice. See 
Weinreb, supra note 15, at 352 (“For the defendant to be held liable, it is not enough that the 
defendant’s negligent act resulted in harm to the plaintiff. The harm has to be to an interest 
that has the status of a right, and the defendant’s action has to be wrongful with respect to 
that right.”). 
 89. By way of example, Goldberg notes that some relational wrongs are no longer 
classified as tort, such as cheating on one’s spouse. John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional 
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 
YALE L.J. 524, 619 (2005). 
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to explain tort law than Posner, Rabin, the reporters for the Restatement (Third), 
Calabresian law and economics, and corrective justice.90 
The founders of civil recourse theory say that their theory is not just an old brick 
fort, guarding the perimeter of private wrongs, but can account for the complexity 
of tort law. Their AALS presentation was a defense of civil recourse against the 
anonymous critic who called it the best tort theory ever devised—for the eighteenth 
century. Together their contributions to the symposium constitute a defense of civil 
recourse and its theoretical power to explain a trilogy of modern cases: Lauer v. 
City of New York,,91 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,92 and Desiano v. Warner-
Lambert & Co.93 In Lauer, the question was whether the City of New York should 
be liable to the father of a three-year-old child for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.94 The father’s claim arose from a cascading series of problems 
arising out of the city medical examiner’s erroneous autopsy report, which he failed 
to correct even after a subsequent investigation revealed that the child’s death was 
from natural causes.95 
The New York City Police Department continued its investigation until a 
newspaper story exposed the facts of the case.96 Only after the newspaper story did 
the medical examiner correct the autopsy findings, terminating the police 
investigation.97 The New York Court of Appeals ruled that Lauer could not pursue 
a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim based upon the ministerial acts of 
the city’s medical examiners because the city owed him no duty.98 New York’s 
highest court concluded that the court had the role of determining the orbit of the 
city’s duty and that “[f]ixing the orbit of duty may be a difficult task. Despite often 
sympathetic facts in a particular case before them, courts must be mindful of the 
precedential, and consequential, future effects of their rulings, and ‘limit the legal 
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.’”99 
Goldberg views Lauer as a poster child for why courts are mistaken to focus on 
macrolevel policy factors100 such as the proliferation of defensive claims intended 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Goldberg advocates stripping tort law of its tendencies to devise “ad hoc solutions to 
perceived social ills.” Goldberg, supra note 29, at 1519. “Such microtort theories, 
spearheaded by the younger generation of torts scholars, are counter-hegemonic because 
they embrace an inwardly turned moral philosophy that rejects the logic of Restatement 
scholars who follow the tradition of Prosser, Green, and other compensation-deterrence 
scholars.” Rustad, supra note 16, at 468 (emphasis in original). 
 91. 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000). 
 92. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), panel opinion vacated en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th 
Cir. 2010). 
 93. 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom. 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008). 
 94. Lauer, 733 N.E.2d at 186. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 188–89. 
 99. Id. at 187. 
 100. The court reasoned: “Time and again [the court has] required that the equation be 
balanced; that the damaged plaintiff be able to point the finger of responsibility at a 
defendant owing, not a general duty to society, but a specific duty to him.” Id. at 187–88 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to defeat a plaintiff’s legitimate claim. Goldberg cites Lauer as a case where a 
worthy plaintiff would have recovered if the court had properly assessed duty 
through civil recourse theory. According to Goldberg, the court should have 
recognized that the victim of the medical examiner’s negligence had an intuitively 
plausible claim, which should not have been so quickly dismissed on policy 
grounds. 
B. Benjamin Zipursky: Civil Recourse Applied to Modern Cases 
Benjamin Zipursky’s AALS panel presentation was part two of the defense of 
civil recourse. Zipursky, who coined the term “civil recourse,” describes this theory 
as nonteleological and not arising out of either corrective or distributive justice.101 
Benjamin Zipursky posits that a touchstone of tort law lies in its substantive 
standing rules of an internalist perspective, focusing on the bilateral relationship 
between plaintiff and defendant.102 Substantive standing is integral to 
understanding the relational nature of private wrongs, and it “refers to the aspect of 
a plaintiff’s injury being of a certain sort relative to the wrong. A substantive 
standing requirement is simply a rule that a plaintiff does not have a tort claim of a 
certain sort unless she has substantive standing (for that tort).”103 
Zipursky’s presentation focused on two modern tort stories: Comer v. Murphy 
Oil USA104 and Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co.105 Zipursky tells Comer’s 
circuitous history, which came to an end when too many Fifth Circuit judges 
recused themselves.106 Comer was a class action lawsuit filed by Mississippi 
residents against dozens of oil and coal companies, charging the defendants with 
contributing to global warming under tort theories of negligence, trespass, and 
public and private nuisance for damages from Hurricane Katrina.107 The plaintiffs’ 
complaint observed, “Hurricane Katrina spawned tornados, mesovortices, wind 
shear, a massive storm surge and related weather events which caused damage, 
death and injury to persons, homes, businesses and other property interests across 
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Zipursky, supra note 14, at 754. 
 102. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective 
Justice, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 299, 304 (2011).  
 103. Id. 
 104. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), panel opinion vacated en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th 
Cir. 2010). 
 105. 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court sub nom. 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008). 
 106. The circuitous history of Comer began with a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ class action 
by the U.S. district court on political standing and justiciability grounds. Comer v. Murphy 
Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853 (S.D. Miss. 2012). Next, a panel of three Fifth 
Circuit judges reversed the district court in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 585 F.3d 855, 
879 (5th Cir. 2009), ruling that the plaintiffs could go forward under a public nuisance cause 
of action. The Fifth Circuit vacated the decision of the three-judge panel and granted a 
rehearing en banc. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010), 
appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 2010), mandamus denied sub nom. In re 
Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011). 
 107. Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint at 31–35, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 
Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (No. 1:05-cv-00436-LTS-RHW). 
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the State of Mississippi.”108 The plaintiffs stated that they were simply seeking 
redress for damages caused by the utilities, not asking the federal district court to 
regulate global warming or change national global warming policy.109 The 
plaintiffs contended that the utilities’ “emissions have also substantially increased 
in frequency and intensity of storms known as hurricanes;
 
effectively doubling the 
frequency of category four and five hurricanes over the past thirty years.”110  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ class action based on the political question doctrine and 
the plaintiffs’ lack of standing.111 Courts have been unreceptive to climate change 
cases, often dismissing these civil actions on political question or standing 
grounds.112 Zipursky contends that an easy case like Comer should never have 
progressed as far as the Fifth Circuit. He doubts whether Holmes or Cardozo would 
have hesitated more than a few seconds before dismissing this action.113 Civil 
recourse theory, he contends, is not putting torts in a box nor does it deny that torts 
address an array of public policies.114 Nevertheless, he warns that torts should not 
be bent out of shape in order to address social problems such as those caused by 
Hurricane Katrina.115 
The second part of Zipursky’s presentation praises Desiano v. Warner-Lambert 
& Co.,116 an opinion authored by Judge Calabresi, one of the symposium’s critics 
of civil recourse theory.117 In Desiano, Michigan consumers suffering from liver 
toxicity linked to a type-2 diabetes treatment called Rezulin filed a products 
liability case against the drug product’s maker.118 “The FDA originally approved 
Rezulin in 1997. After adverse liver-related effects were documented in patients 
taking Rezulin, [the pharmaceutical company] agreed to a series of label changes, 
which were authorized by the FDA on four occasions between November 1997 and 
June 1999.”119 A 1995 Michigan tort reform immunized drug makers from tort 
liability unless they committed a fraud on the FDA.120 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. Id. at 22. 
 109. Id. at 17–18. 
 110. Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted). 
 111. Comer, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 853. 
 112. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (dismissing case filed by an Alaskan village against energy companies for coast 
erosion due to global warming); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 
WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing public nuisance action on the grounds 
that it is a political question). 
 113. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Address at the Association of American Law Schools 
Annual Meeting, Twenty-First Century Tort Theories: A New Audit of Civil Recourse 
Theory (Jan. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Zipursky Podcast], available at http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/tortsprof/2012/07/podcast-of-2012-aals-panel-on-civil-recourse-theory.html. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom. 
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008). 
 117. Zipursky Podcast, supra note 113. 
 118. Warner-Lambert Co., 522 U.S. at 88. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 87–88. 
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The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action on grounds of 
preemption, relying upon the U.S. Supreme Court case Buckman121 and the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Garcia.122 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district 
court by holding that Buckman does apply since Desiano’s claims were not based 
on a fraud-on-the-FDA theory.123 As in Comer, the U.S. Supreme Court could not 
decide the case on the merits because the recusal of a Justice produced a 4-4 
split.124 Professor Zipursky argues that civil recourse theory explains best why the 
Second Circuit correctly decided this case and that this theory is able to address the 
“brave new world of tort law.”125 The civil recourse theorists contend that their 
analysis of the modern torts cases is a superior theory to law and economics, 
corrective justice, and all other twenty-first-century torts jurisprudence. Few tort 
scholars will disagree with Professors Goldberg and Zipursky’s claim that torts 
provide injured persons with an official avenue to redress their claims. The critics 
charge that civil recourse is not able to explain the complexity of twenty-first-
century law. 
III. MEET THE CRITICS OF CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY 
A. Guido Calabresi’s Critique of Civil Recourse’s Reductionism 
Judge Guido Calabresi, a founding father of the law and economics school of 
tort theory along with Richard A. Posner, was the first scholar to develop a 
framework for analyzing deterrence in achieving what he views as accident law’s 
primary function of reducing the cost of accidents.126 Judge Calabresi, the 2011 
William Lloyd Prosser Award recipient, explores the implications of boiling down 
tort law’s multiple functions into one thing: civil recourse. 
Civil recourse, to put it bluntly, is a frontal attack on Judge Calabresi’s theory of 
tort law as an economically based system of efficient compensation and deterrence. 
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky want to divert our gaze away from the costs and 
prevention of accidents and, instead, take a microlevel view of individualized 
justice as being a contest between the plaintiff and the defendant. In their 2010 
Texas Law Review article, Goldberg and Zipursky blame the tort academy’s 
obsession with accident law for the gravitational pull away from private wrongs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 341 (2001) (holding that 
state law claims that authorized recovery against medical device and drug manufacturers, 
where regulatory approval was allegedly procured through “fraud on the FDA,” were 
preempted). 
 122. Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 965–66 (6th Cir. 2004).  
 123. Desiano, 467 F.3d at 98 (reasoning that Michigan’s statutory exceptions were not 
preempted because, unlike in a stand-alone fraud-on-the-FDA claim, plaintiffs’ claims were 
traditional tort claims not predicated upon fraud). 
 124. See Warner-Lambert Co., 522 U.S. at 440–41. 
 125. Zipursky Podcast, supra note 113. 
 126. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 24–26 (1970) (acknowledging that justice is an important goal, but doubting 
whether one can say much about it independent of the other goals, except to acknowledge 
that it exists as an ultimate goal); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
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and individual justice accounts.127 The civil recourse founders contend that the 
fundamental dichotomy in American tort law is private wrongs versus the 
“allocation of accidentally caused losses.”128 
Judge Calabresi’s contribution to the symposium hones in on Professors 
Goldberg and Zipursky’s reductionism by highlighting the failure of the latter 
authors to explain why something becomes a tort in the first place. Judge Calabresi 
takes issue with Professor Goldberg’s critique of Lauer v. City of New York,129 
asserting that the tort lesson learned from this case is how little civil recourse has to 
do with the factors that determine duty, such as deterrence, loss spreading, and 
economic effects. 
Judge Calabresi’s critique is that civil recourse does not deal adequately with 
how—and what makes—a thing or an act become a wrong. While the judge 
acknowledges that civil recourse theorists have an insight about what is missing in 
the discussion of justice—reduction of the sum of accident costs—this theory does 
not explain the many cases that broach the subject. His article addresses why civil 
recourse does not mesh well with the concepts and methods of products liability, 
and contends that the key question in product liability cases is not about a 
manufacturer reaching out and injuring an individual plaintiff. Rather, the core 
question ponders the level of risk that the defendant manufacturer and victim must 
bear. He also notes that civil recourse says nothing about how courts decide when it 
is the manufacturer or the victims who must bear the burden of a devastating 
products injury, at either the macro- or microlevel. 
A serious shortcoming of civil recourse theorists, Judge Calabresi argues, is to 
view tort law as being detached from a larger system of liability law. He asks us to 
imagine the consequences if we abolished torts and adopted New Zealand’s 
compensation system where there is no private relation. He asks what would be 
lost, and whether other legal institutions could fulfill civil recourse. 
Judge Calabresi questions whether civil recourse alone is enough to justify the 
whole structure of torts and argues that the fundamental problem with civil 
recourse is that it is reductionist.130 Judge Calabresi’s teacher Fleming James 
described the heterogeneous mass of stuff that constituted tort law: 
 This heterogeneous law of torts did not grow up because it was 
inspired by any one integrating principle. Under the formulary system 
of the common law its growth was piecemeal and fragmented. The 
roots of some torts are lost in antiquity. Others are relatively modern. 
The result is a hodge-podge. 
 Yet ever since the law was liberated from the procedural shackles of 
the forms of action, there has been a strong school of thought which has 
sought to find, or to construct, a unifying principle which would give 
integrity to the whole law of torts. . . .  
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. See Goldberg & Zipurksy, supra note 81, at 929. 
 128. Id. at 919. 
 129. 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000). 
 130. See also Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts—The Case of Punitative 
Damages, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 333, 333 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (arguing that 
reductionism is common in tort theory as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s punitive damages 
jurisprudence that reduces this complex remedy to one thing: retributory justice). 
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. . . . 
 The truth is there is no single integrating principle of tort liability save 
one so broad that it answers nothing, though it may suggest fruitful 
inquiries.131 
Judge Calabresi observes that too many scholars move quickly to reduce the 
common law to a single dimension when tort law’s strongest suit is that it does 
many things. His thesis is that civil recourse, like other twenty-first-century torts 
theories, is reductionist and offers no explanation about how or why something 
becomes a civil wrong. Professor Zipursky acknowledges the problem of circularity 
in his recent Florida State University symposium article: 
 The problem that arises, for civil recourse theory, is that a condition 
for the adequacy of the theory since the very beginning has been its 
capacity to provide a noncircular explanation of the substantive 
standing rule. For someone endeavoring, like Darwall, to structure an 
integrative theory of moral concepts, the circularity is not necessarily 
vicious. But given that a desideratum of . . . the legal problems with 
which I started was the capacity to generate a nonvacuous explanation, 
the circularity is vicious here.132 
Judge Calabresi agrees with civil recourse theorists in that tort law is not just 
about reducing the sum of accidents by acknowledging that any tort scholar who 
exclusively looks at accident law has no real understanding of torts. He also 
observes that the microlevel perspective of civil recourse is functionally equivalent 
to the role of an individual judge, in an individual case, determining whether a 
plaintiff has been injured in a way that requires the recourse. However, Judge 
Calabresi also believes that torts have a macrolevel that is concerned with reducing 
the sum of accident costs. 
To Judge Calabresi, the fundamental question that any interpretative tort theory 
must answer is: Why is there a duty sometimes, and not at other times? He 
maintains that neither corrective justice theorists, nor the civil recourse theorists, 
have an adequate explanation of why something becomes a civil wrong. Judge 
Calabresi contends that what makes torts different is that the collectivity sets the 
price of recourse and that is what separates torts from other common law subjects. 
B. Richard Posner’s Critique of Civil Recourse Theory 
This year’s William Lloyd Prosser recipient is the Honorable Richard A. Posner, 
Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Senior 
Lecturer of Torts at the University of Chicago Law School. Judge Posner, the 
author of more than forty books ranging from such topics as tort law, economics, 
and legal theory, is a major figure in the positive theory of legal efficiency of tort 
law.133 Not since Holmes has there been a more prolific tort lawmaker; his 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Fleming James, Jr., Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 
BUFF. L. REV. 315, 315–16, 320 (1959) (footnotes omitted). 
 132. Zipursky, supra note 102, at 323. 
 133. Paul H. Rubin, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Law & Economics, 
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opinions, widely reprinted in casebooks, shape the teaching of tort law. He is one of 
the most prolific explicators of American tort law as indicated by his 547 appellate 
opinions addressing some issue of tort litigation.134 His influential judicial opinions 
and academic writing have reconceptualized the setting of the standard of care 
through the lens of economic considerations.135 Judge Posner changed the path of 
American tort law with his insight that positive economics apply to all branches of 
law, far beyond tort law.136 Judge Posner coauthored with Professor William 
Landes “the first book-length study of the economics of tort law.”137 They describe 
the law of torts as “best explained as if the judges . . . were trying to promote 
efficient resource allocation.”138 Judge Posner and Professor Landes’s view of the 
law of torts is that it induces optimal care to avert expected accident costs.139 They 
contend that market forces cause private actors to make optimal decisions to protect 
safety and thus efficiency.140 
Civil recourse theorists reject the law and economics work of Judges Posner and 
Calabresi, both of whom believe that a central purpose of tort law is to place 
liability on the cheapest-cost avoider141 or “to promote efficient . . . allocation.”142 
Professor Zipursky notes the philosophical division between these two legal giants: 
                                                                                                                 
LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/LawandEconomics.html 
(“The positive theory of legal efficiency states that the common law (judge-made law, the 
main body of law in England and its former colonies, including the United States) is 
efficient, while the normative theory is that the law should be efficient. It is important that 
the two theories remain separate. Most economists accept both.” (emphasis in original)). 
 134. Judge Posner lists “575 tort opinions, in order of number of total citations (from 
largest number to smallest), including both judicial and nonjudicial (law review and book) 
citations.” Richard A Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 88 
IND. L.J. 469, 487–519 (2013). 
 135. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972) 
(“If . . . the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the costs of prevention, society is better off 
if those costs are incurred and the accident averted, and so in this case the [injurer] is made 
liable, in the expectation that self-interest will lead it to adopt the precautions in order to 
avoid a greater cost in tort judgments.”); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 85 
(reconceptualizing the famous Hand formula B < PL (that is, the Burden must be less than 
the product of the loss and the probability of harm) as illustrating the efficiency of the 
common law).  
 136. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 68–70, 213–14; RICHARD A. POSNER 
& KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S SEX LAWS (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark 
Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Next 
Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 6 (1981); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1982); Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). See generally 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007). 
 137. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at vii. 
 138. Id. at 1. 
 139. Id. at 54–62. 
 140. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort 
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 871–77 (1981). 
 141. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). 
 142. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 1. 
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It goes like this: the major battle in tort theory in the last three decades 
of the Twentieth Century was a battle between two ideologically 
opposed forces within the theoretical school of law and economics. One 
side was represented by Richard Posner of the University of Chicago, 
which is famous for its right-leaning love of the free market. Posner’s 
Hand-formula based tort theory takes negligence to be the fundamental 
principle of tort law, which has the effect of reducing the liabilities of 
commercial actors to the amount necessary for them to internalize the 
costs of their activities, at the same time diminishing the capacity of the 
state to use tort law as a means of income redistribution, and smoothing 
the way for more unfettered market activity. The other side was 
represented by Guido Calabresi of Yale Law School, bastion of 
Northeast liberal egalitarian thinking. Calabresi’s cheapest-cost avoider 
based theory takes strict liability to be the fundamental principle of tort 
law, permitting decentralized and demoralized deterrence and seeing to 
it that sophisticated and wealthy market actors who are better situated 
than ordinary individuals to make risk-reducing and risk-spreading 
decisions will make such decisions via the de facto third-party 
insurance of strict liability in tort.143 
Law and economics is a macrolevel approach viewing tort rules as a subset of 
liability rules for allocating loss and minimizing accident costs. Judges Calabresi 
and Posner, two of the three “most influential legal thinkers in the field over the 
past forty years,” are tackling civil recourse theory through the lens of macrolevel 
law and economics.144 In his symposium piece, Instrumental and Non-Instrumental 
Theories of Tort Law, Judge Posner praises civil recourse theory for jettisoning the 
historical baggage of corrective justice. Judge Posner describes the mission of tort 
law as “minimizing the sum of accident and accident-avoidance costs (but also 
deterring intentional and reckless loss-inflicting acts).”145 He states that the claim of 
civil recourse theory—that it is better than any other positive theory—is 
“demonstrably mistaken,” citing two recent articles.146  
He takes issue with Professor Goldberg and Zipursky’s characterization of one 
of his opinions, Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.,147 and chides the 
professors, as well as the Texas Law Review cite checkers, for not correcting such a 
“garbled summary of the Mathias opinion.”148 He notes that his opinion does not 
say or imply that punitive damages are awarded only in order to induce suits to 
enforce modest claims or to encourage plaintiffs “to uncover hidden wrongs.”149 
Judge Posner asserts that Professors Goldberg and Zipursky missed the central 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Richard Epstein and the Cold War in Torts, 3 J. TORT L. 1, 1 
(2010) (footnote omitted). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Posner, supra note 134, at 470. 
 146. Id. (citing Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 
TENN. L. REV. 431 (2011); Rustad, supra note 16). 
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point of his decision: that the higher ratio punitive damages award was necessary 
“to provide an adequate remedy.”150 He notes that even if the jury had approved a 
ratio of 145 to 1, as was struck down in Campbell, the award would have been an 
insufficiently large incentive to sue.151  
Judge Posner questions whether civil recourse or any single theory could explain 
the complexity of tort law. He then posits the key question left unanswered by civil 
recourse theorists: “[S]upposing that tort law is dedicated to providing ‘some sort 
of redress’ for people injured by ‘wrongful’ conduct, where do we go to find out 
what is a ‘wrong’?”152 He charges that it is the failure of civil recourse theorists to 
answer this question that makes the theory “collaps[e] into tautology.”153 Judge 
Posner, like Judge Calabresi, does not see how civil recourse theory determines 
what is a wrong or what is wrongful. 
C. Civil Recourse Theory Meets Critical Feminist Theory 
Tort law in its splendor is a complex “cultural mirror” that reflects societal 
disputes over such topics as personal honor, social class, race, gender relations, 
corporate power, environmental degradation, and many other macrosocietal 
issues.154 In her presentation, Professor Martha Chamallas, the Robert J. Lynn 
Chair of Law at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, criticizes civil 
recourse theory from a critical feminist perspective.155 Civil recourse theory is 
strangely silent about external variables of class, race, power, and gender relations 
that are central to Professor Chamallas’s scholarship. The detachment of civil 
recourse theory from social context reminds me of Garrison Keillor’s view of the 
New York Times: “It reads like it was edited by two elderly sociologists, one of 
whom has been dead for many years.”156  
Civil recourse theory fails to grapple with the growing body of empirical 
research showing that race and gender matter when it comes to tort damages.157 In 
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critical feminist legal theory, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY (3rd ed. 2012) and MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF 
INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010). 
 156. Garrison Keillor Quotes, THINKEXIST.COM, http://thinkexist.com/quotes/garrison_ 
keillor/3.html. 
 157. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, 
and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005); Lucinda M. 
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stark contrast to the logical model of civil recourse, tort law is messy because it is 
always in a constant state of flux, and it reflects an infinite stream of unsettled and 
conflicting issues. At its eidetic core, the Goldberg and Zipursky project is to 
reduce the complex, unsettled torts landscape to a single, internally consistent 
dimension.158 If we repress torts’ embattled public functions by blowing out lamps 
such as social control, deterrence, efficiency, and social justice, we risk repeating 
the past errors of formalists. Philosopher Stephen Toulmin believes that the 
misplaced search for certainty is a “perennial disease of modern thought.”159 Justice 
Holmes, too, concluded that the search for certainty in the common law was a folly. 
In The Path of the Law, he wrote, “certainty . . . is illusion, and repose is not the 
destiny of man.”160 Civil recourse theory seeks to interpret and explain the tort 
litigation process of naming, blaming, and claiming.  
Professor Chamallas’s article begins with praise for Professors Goldberg and 
Zipursky and states what she admires about civil recourse.161 She observes that 
civil recourse has recently given torts a stature that it would not otherwise have.162 
In their Oxford University treatise, Goldberg and Zipursky present their image of 
torts as a gallery of wrongs—subsequently presenting civil recourse theory in an 
elegant way.163 While each room in their torts gallery is exquisitely appointed, there 
is no room for unrealized wrongs, or for serious recurring injuries not recognized as 
torts. Professor Chamallas observes—and the civil recourse theorists do not—that 
these injuries tend to be reproductive injuries, prenatal injuries, spousal abuse, and 
injuries disproportionately suffered by women.164 
                                                                                                                 
Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 
(1997); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in 
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995).  
 158. See Rustad, supra note 16, at 434–39. 
These individual-justice theorists are also disengaged from the political crucible 
of torts where the entrenched special interests are blatantly political and self 
interested. John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, the founding fathers 
of civil recourse, steer free of the disorderly social context world, turning 
instead to the self-contained sphere of moral philosophy. 
Id. at 439 (footnote omitted). 
 159. Stephen Toulmin stated,  
I’m consciously associating myself with John Dewey, who also, in the late 
1920s, picked on the quest for certainty as a perennial disease of modern 
thought, although he never sat down and thought enough from a historical point 
of view about why this quest for certainty had the kinds of attractions it had in 
the first half of the seventeenth century and provided the kind of mold or 
template on which modern science, modern politics, modern philosophy were 
shaped. 
Sheldon Hackney, A Conversation with Stephen Toulmin, HUMANITIES, Apr./Mar. 1997, at 4. 
 160. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 
(1897). 
 161. Martha Chamallas, Beneath the Surface of Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 527, 
527 (2013). 
 162. Id. 
 163. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 40, at 27–45 (discussing tort law’s “gallery of 
wrongs”). 
 164. See Chamallas, supra note 161, at 531. Chamallas’s indictment of civil recourse 
applies equally well to other torts scholarship. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the 
Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 52 
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Professor Chamallas characterizes Goldberg and Zipursky as this generation’s 
grand theorists. In her view, Professors Goldberg and Zipursky’s work comes out 
of classical legal theory that describes and interprets the inner logic of tort law 
without much interest in the messy world of race, class, or gender. The central 
image of this theory is the empowerment of the tort victim who responds to injury 
by vindicating his rights. She describes civil recourse as a masculine theory: 
attractive to tort scholars who prefer elegant theories and assuming away the 
complex cultural interactions, inequities, and socio-legal feedback loops that exist 
in the real world. The masculine voice of the theory compounded with active and 
muscular images, such as “vindicating,” “redressing,” or “retaliating against 
wrongs” ignore the insights of feminist scholars. Her work draws heavily from 
legal realism and views tort law as a public response to a victim’s injury. To 
Professor Chamallas, it is tort law that provides the response—not the victim. In 
contrast, the state withers away, providing only the forum or venue for private 
disputes in civil recourse theory. Professor Chamallas describes civil recourse as a 
theory where the heavy lifting is done by the private sector, not by public law. 
Goldberg and Zipursky draw upon the locus classicus of the legal process 
school when they stress how the judge must follow the law, not become a knight-
errant, doing what she perceives to be just.165 The duo’s slashing polemics posit a 
closed system, while Professor Chamallas favors an evolving and open-ended 
approach to tort law. 
In their recent book, The Measure of Injury,166 Martha Chamallas and Jennifer 
Wriggins demonstrate the importance of race and gender in understanding the tort 
landscape. Their book shows that from the Jim Crow South to the September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund, race and gender matter; women and minorities have 
been under-compensated in tort law and these traditional biases continue to infect 
American tort law. Goldberg and Zipursky’s internal bilateral theory does not 
discuss such patterns of disparate recovery by females and persons of color. In the 
rarefied world of legal philosophy, the public and cultural dimensions of tort law 
are not central or even peripheral. 
D. Christopher Robinette’s: Torts’ Two Divergent Roads 
In the late 1950s, Fleming James, summarizing empirical research on accident 
law, stated, “Only insurance companies and large corporate self-insurers pay 
anything to speak of in the way of tort damages and settlements. . . . In short, the 
individuals whose personal fault constitutes the legal basis of liability do not pay 
                                                                                                                 
(1989). Traditional tort law has been openly patriarchal. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, 
History and The Legal Process: A Profile of the “Reasonable Man,” 8 RUTGERS CAMDEN 
L.J. 311, 312 (1977). 
 165. BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 159 (1994) (“Hart and Sacks contend that 
such rationality, restraint, and fairness could be achieved through the appropriate ‘black 
letter’ distribution of institutional power and the adherence to evenhanded procedure coupled 
with the inculcation of jurists into a proper culture. . . . By seeking systematic constraint and 
procedural fairness, the Process School seeks to depoliticize law as much as feasible while 
permitting law to reflect organic changes in social policy.”). 
 166. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 155. 
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for the accidents they negligently cause.”167 Robinette’s article updates Fleming 
James’s portrait of tort law for the twenty-first century in highlighting 
routinization, insurance, and alternative compensation systems, which are topics 
given short shrift by civil recourse theorists. He is the author of many books and 
articles on tort law and tort theory,168 which focus on the role of insurers and ask 
how civil recourse can claim to unify the law when civil recourse theorists do not 
account for the routinization of tort law. Professor Robinette expresses agreement 
with Professors Goldberg and Zipursky’s affirmative claim that tort is about 
wrongs, but contends that their exclusion of instrumentalist factors such as 
compensation, deterrence, and administrative efficiency is erroneous.169 Professor 
Robinette argues that all “major tort reforms over the last century—workers’ 
compensation, no-fault automobile reform, products liability, and ‘modern’ 
reforms—were based in instrumentalism. Moreover, when the reforms are viewed 
chronologically, a pattern develops: In each successive reform, instrumentalism 
made increasing inroads into tort.”170 The question he asks is, as pondered also by 
singer Peggy Lee, “is that all there is”171—to tort law? Professor Robinette 
contrasts the wrongs-oriented tort law of civil recourse with the empirical evidence 
of the routinization of claims, especially in automobile accident law.172 
Professor Robinette’s insight is that tort theory requires both a microscope and a 
macroscope; he views the micro- and macrotheorists as complementary approaches, 
both being necessary for comprehensive torts jurisprudence.173 Economists tell us 
that tort law promotes efficiency by giving people incentives to take account of 
costs they impose on others, whereas philosophers champion corrective justice as a 
method of advancing moral behavior by requiring wrongdoers to repair the 
wrongful losses they cause. On the one hand, there are the micro theories of 
corrective justice and civil recourse. On the other, there are the macro approaches 
of compensation and deterrence, social justice,174 and empirically oriented law and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. James, supra note 131, at 330 (emphasis omitted). 
 168. He is the co-author (with Jeffrey O’Connell) of the book A RECIPE FOR BALANCED 
TORT REFORM (2008) and is the editor of 6 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE (2011). 
 169. Christopher J. Robinette, Two Roads Diverge for Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. 
L.J. 543, 543 (2013). 
 170. Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. 
REV. 431, 433 (2011). 
 171. PEGGY LEE, Is That All There Is?, on IS THAT ALL THERE IS? (Capitol Records 
1969). 
 172. See Robinette, supra note 169, at 550–66. 
 173. Christopher J. Robinette, Can There Be a Unified Theory of Torts? A Pluralist 
Suggestion from History and Doctrine, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 369, 369–70 (2005); Christopher J. 
Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 347 
(2007); Robinette, supra note 170. 
 174.  
Social justice theorists conceive of tort as a device for rectifying imbalances 
in political power. . . . Moneyed interests, particularly corporations, block or 
distort legislation and capture regulatory agencies designed to monitor and 
control them. As a result, these interests are able to pursue the self-interest of 
their executives and shareholders at the expense of the general public by 
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society theories. Robinette sees much to commend both the internal view of the 
theories of corrective justice and civil recourse to supplement, but not supplant, the 
external view of the compensation and deterrence theorists.175 Robinette concedes 
that deontic wrongs are fundamental to tort law, but argues that it is an incomplete 
account because it leaves out critical functions such as compensation, risk 
allocation, and deterrence.176 His pluralistic theory is reminiscent of another great 
theorist, George Wilhelm Hegel. Hegel’s Phenomenology was predicated upon a 
triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.177 Theses, and antitheses, appear to be 
separate but actually exist in a dialectical relationship leading toward a new 
synthesis.178 Tort law’s internal and external dimensions may similarly exist in a 
complex relationship. Civil recourse theory is radically incomplete, needing to 
consider the underlying dynamic between multiple tort principles. 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
producing dangerous products and hiding critical information about their 
dangerousness. . . .  
By arming citizens with the power to sue corporations for misconduct 
outside of the legislative and regulatory process, tort corrects for this imbalance 
of power. In particular, it permits independent judges and especially juries to 
hold corporate America and other powerful actors accountable. . . .  Likewise, 
product liability suits restrain pharmaceutical companies from profiteering on 
dangerous and ineffective drugs. The social justice conception of tort is most 
closely associated in practice with Ralph Nader. Scholars who have developed 
this conception further include Richard Abel, Anita Bernstein, Carl Bogus, 
Thomas Koenig, and Michael Rustad. 
Goldberg, supra note 9, at 560. The social justice school, as its name suggests, treats torts as 
a form of social control. It seeks to control corporate misconduct by generating penalties that 
send a message of deterrence to corporate America. In tort, the citizen can both vindicate his 
or her own claim to rights against the powerful and act as a private attorney general policing 
the conduct of these actors. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 157. “[S]ocial justice theory 
emphasizes the pivotal role played by damage awards—particularly punitive damage 
awards—in restraining self-interested corporate conduct. Only punitive damages, social 
justice theory supposes, can establish that ‘tort does not pay’ by hitting the rich and powerful 
in the bank account.” Goldberg, supra note 9, at 561. 
 175. See Robinette, supra note 169, at 564–66. 
 176. See id. 
 177. “This triadic movement is based on the thought of nineteenth-century philosopher 
G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831). Hegel’s dialectic includes thesis, antithesis, and synthesis . . . .” 
JAMES H. HARRIS, PREACHING LIBERATION 99 (emphasis added) (discussing G.W.F. HEGEL, 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (1807)); see also HOWARD P. KAINZ, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT, WITH MARX’S COMMENTARY: A HANDBOOK FOR STUDENTS 7 (1974). 
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